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MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE THROUGH THE
TAILORING OF PATENT DURATION AND
USING ALGORITHMS TO CALCULATE
OPTIMAL PATENT DURATION
Alvaro Cure Dominguez*
ABSTRACT— Patents are legal devices granted by the government that
confer inventors exclusive rights to their invention for a limited time. In
exchange, the U.S. government requires the inventors to publicly disclose
their invention to allow individuals to recreate it upon expiration of the
exclusivity period. Previously, academics regarded patents as a necessary
means to overcome the free-rider dilemma (“FRD”), and they assumed that,
without patents, society would be deprived of many potentially valuable
innovations.1 This model has come under criticism.2 Researchers point to
cases where inventors would have innovated regardless of a patent grant.3
They also highlight instances where patent owners use patents in ways not
originally contemplated under this model and that create additional societal

*

Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, J.D., expected 2022. I would like to thank Associate
Dean Laura Pedraza-Fariña for her help and guidance with the note and the JTIP staff for their editing
work. I am grateful to my wife Kim, my family, and my colleagues (especially, to Luisa, Runzhi, Mike,
and the rest of the Patents team who first introduced me to patents) who, without their support,
encouragement, and example, this note would not have been possible.
1 The Free-Rider Dilemma describes the conundrum inventors face in a free market where, absent
property rights to protect their ideas, these inventors are discouraged from innovating because free-riding
competitors may copy their ideas at a fraction of the price by not incurring expensive invention costs.
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism, 30 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 103, 116–17 (2016). One “standout example is pharmaceuticals . . . [where it] is widely
understood that, absent an alternative reward structure like regulatory exclusivity or suitably tailored
prizes, innovation in the life sciences industry would suffer catastrophic decline without patent
protection.” Id. at 117.
2
See e.g., Lucas S. Osborn, Joshua M. Pearce & Amberlee Haselhuhn, A Case for Weakening Patent
Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2015) (stating that “monopoly pricing and follow-on
impedance represent two of the most prominent” harms that result from the patent system).
3 See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61
UCLA L. Rev. 672, 689–91 (2014) (footnote omitted) (explaining how “many inventions would reach
the public even without . . . [patents because it] takes time for other firms to develop and commercialize
their own version of a rival’s invention, which gives the innovator time to recover some or all its R&D
costs.”). This is known as First-Mover Advantage. See id. at 738-40.
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deadweight loss.4 Furthermore, patents have a standardized term of duration,
which, in many cases, is counterproductive to the patent system’s intended
goal of maximizing social welfare.5
This note explores and categorizes some of the external, noneconomic
alternative mechanisms that incentivize innovation and result in inventors
overcoming the FRD. This note also points to factors that affect an inventor’s
responsiveness to incentive mechanisms, such as industry type. The note
then considers different policy levers that affect patent strength, emphasizing
patent duration. The note explores how these levers interact with incentive
mechanisms to create optimal duration patents that maximize social welfare.
Lastly, this note proposes an algorithm for calculating optimal patent
duration and identifies essential variables for feeding into the algorithm.
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I.

PATENTS AS A MEANS FOR INCENTIVIZING INNOVATION

Patents have existed in the U.S. for almost as long as the nation itself.
With its ratification in 1788, the Constitution granted Congress the power
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective

4

See, e.g., David S. Olson, Removing the Troll from the Thicket: The Case for Enhancing Patent
Maintenance Fees in Relation to the Size of a Patent Owner’s Patent Portfolio, 68 FLA. L. REV. 519, 528,
534 (2017) (discussing the deadweight loss associated with non-practicing entities and patent thickets).
5 F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 422, 426 (1972) (describing cases where “[a] uniform policy of long-lived patent grants
confers excessive private rewards in these cases” at a cost to social welfare).
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Writings and Discoveries.”6 Within two years, Congress enacted the first
patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790, which granted petitioners who had
“invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used . . . [and
deemed] sufficiently useful and important[, a] letters patent.”7 The letters
patents (hereafter “patents”) granted petitioners, “for any term not exceeding
fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making,
constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or
discovery.”8 In return, the Act required the inventors to “recit[e] the
allegations and suggestions of the said petition, and describ[e] the said
invention or discovery, clearly, truly and fully.”9
Conceptually, patents are a straight-forward legal instrument—an
individual comes up with a new idea; the individual reduces the idea to a
functional invention; the individual publicly discloses the invention with
sufficient specificity so that others may reproduce; in return, the inventor
receives exclusive rights from the government to use and sell their invention
for a limited time.10 From a social welfare point-of-view, society benefits
from a new invention that would otherwise not have been discovered.11 In
return, society grants the inventor exclusive rights for a limited period at a
cost to its social welfare.12
Congress adopted part of the concepts for its federal patent system from
the English system.13 In particular, the patent term of fourteen years
6

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–12 (repealed 1793).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (“The traditional economic justification for intellectual property is well known.
Ideas are public goods: they can be copied freely and used by anyone who is aware of them without
depriving others of their use.”); John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 439 (2004); A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 275–77 (1996).
11 A separate but related function to invention incentives of patents is public disclosure. This is the
Patent Disclosure Theory. See Heidi L. Williams, How do Patents Affect Research Investments? 5 (Nat’l
Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23088, 2017) (stating “[p]art of the ‘grand bargain’ struck by
the design of the patent system is that in exchange for receiving a patent, inventors must publicly disclose
their invention. This is in contrast with keeping their invention secret, which would be done – for example
– with trade secrecy.”).
12 See Scherer, supra note 5, at 424 (explaining the relationship between the patent term and social
costs). “Ignoring the redistributive implications of this change . . . the ‘price’ society pays to induce a
reduction in unit costs . . . is essentially the sacrifice of the ‘welfare triangle’ . . . from the time the
invention is introduced until the date of patent expiration, plus the inventor’s RD costs.” Id.
13 Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, Rethinking the Length of Patent Terms, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 787,
788–92 (2019) (citations omitted); see Jon Dudas & David Kline, Thank the Founding Fathers for the
Open
Market
in
Patents,
FORBES
(Sept.
17,
2013,
03:07
PM),
7
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originally stipulated by Congress was the same length as the English patent
term under the Statute of Monopolies.14 The English system, in turn, likely
adopted this fourteen-year term from the standard apprenticeship term at the
time in England.15 In England, it was common for the King to confer
craftsmen exclusive rights to implement their new inventions on the
condition that the craftsmen take in local apprentices and train them in the
technology.16 Hence, it is also likely that, as with the fourteen-year term, the
U.S. Patent system also adopted from the English system the model of
granting limited-term exclusive rights—the letters patent—on the condition
that inventors enable and instruct others on how to create their inventions.
A. The Patent Bargain and a Conflict of Interests
Like actors in a free market, inventors are presumably rational, profitseeking entities looking to maximize economic returns on their invention by
charging each consumer the highest price possible—the willingness-to-pay
price (“WTP”). Society, representing the individual consumers’ collective
interest, is presumably, too, a rational, profit-seeking entity looking to pay
the inventor as little as possible for their invention—the willingness-toaccept price (“WTA”). Hence, the patent strikes a bargain.17
In economic terms, patents represent a tradeoff—the inventor publicly
discloses their invention and instructions on how to recreate it and, in
exchange for this disclosure, the inventor receives exclusive rights to their
invention for a limited period. The patent owner can then use these rights to
create a limited-term “monopoly”18 where the inventor fixes their invention’s
sale price. This price-fixing results in deadweight loss, consumer surplus,
and monopoly profits.19 Deadweight loss is the loss to society that results
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2013/09/17/thank-the-founding-fathers-for-theopen-market-in-patents/?sh=4bf88aae220a [https://perma.cc/K5V6-QNB4] (explaining how the
founding fathers, regarding the English system as skewed towards the wealthy and capital-intensive
industries, intentionally “designed a patent system that could do what no other had done before, stimulate
the inventive genius and entrepreneurial energy of the common man”).
14 Lester & Zhu, supra note 13, at 792.
15 The standard apprenticeship term was seven years. Id. at 789. Although there are different theories
as to why fourteen instead of seven years, most researchers agree it was due to fourteen years being a
multiple of the seven-year term. Id.
16 Id.
17 See Mario Biagioli, Weighing Intellectual Property: Can We Balance the Social Costs and Benefits
of Patenting?, 57 HIST. SCI. 140, 159–60 (2019) (representing the patent bargain as a balancing scale).
18 As used throughout this note, monopoly refers to a patent owner’s ability to fix a price for his
invention above the marginal cost of production because of the patent. This is not a monopoly in the
traditional economic sense because the price-fixing is still subject to certain financial limitations, such as
consumers’ ability to buy an alternative product. See Scherer, supra note 5, at 422–23.
19 William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical
Perspectives, 37 INDUS. PROP., INNOVATION, & THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., BELEIDSSTUDIES
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from consumers who would be willing to pay a price for the invention that
is between the inventor’s fixed price and the marginal cost of production
(“MCP”) but now, because of the patent, are outpriced and will not benefit
from the invention.20 Consumer surplus is the gain to society that results from
consumers who would be willing to pay a price for the invention above the
inventor’s fixed price, but now, because of the patent, they are paying less
than they otherwise would have.21 The inventor’s monopoly profits are the
producers’ gains from selling his product at a fixed price above the MCP.22
By enabling patentees to charge and collect these monopoly profits, patents
provide a means for inventors to recoup their development costs. In the case
where the monopoly profits exceed development costs, the patents generate
monopoly rents.23 These monopoly profits and monopoly rents, in turn,
incentivize inventors to innovate.24
1. The Patent Incentive Theory & The Free Rider Dilemma
With a patent, inventors receive the exclusive right to market their
invention for a limited time.25 Upon exhaustion of the patent term, this
exclusive right expires, and the invention enters the public domain.26 When
the invention enters the public domain, the inventor has presumably
recouped their development costs and, from this point on, market forces will
determine the invention’s sales price.27 If inventors did not have the right to
exclude others, competitors would be able to replicate the invention, drop
the price to the MCP, and prevent inventors from recouping their
development costs.
Consider, for example, the process of developing a novel, therapeutic
use drug in the U.S. The process usually begins with identifying and
selecting new concept compounds by chemists and biologists,; screening
TECHNOLOGIE ECONOMIE 1, 4–6 (2001), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PX3-Q4HE] (discussing these variables and representing in graphical form); see
Scherer, supra note 5, at 422–23.
20 Fisher, supra note 19, at 4–6.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 18 (2013)
(explaining how, given the asymmetry between the rent of the monopolist and the individual consumer’s
deadweight loss, “the monopolist has an incentive to perpetuate the system while the individual consumer
has no incentive to fight it”).
24 Fisher, supra note 19, at 13 (explaining how compulsory licensing, “by reducing the profits that
firms can make . . . may reduce the capacity of intellectual-property rights to stimulate innovation”).
25 Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
269, 272 (2006) (discussing patents as limited-term monopolies).
26 Id.
27 See id. (discussing how a patent allows patentees to “appropriate not only monetary returns from
their innovations but also the psychic reward of being able to control their own creations”).
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these concept compounds for pharmacologic activity and toxicity; filing
regulatory applications with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration;
collecting efficacy and safety information in three separate phases of clinical
testing; finally, if approved, marketing the new drug.28 In 1990, researchers
estimated these costs to average around $231 million dollars.29 A group of
these same researchers estimated the costs to have increased to
approximately $802 million dollars in 2003.30
A pharmaceutical company developing a new therapeutic drug would
have to account for recovery of these development costs in their product
pricing model. Absent patent protection, a competitor could copy the new
drug and market it at a lower price because it would not need to account for
the development costs. Faced with the threat that their competitors could
copy their inventions and without guarantees for recouping their investment,
rational inventors would be disincentivized to innovate. This is the free-rider
dilemma (“FRD”).31 Patents result in an overcoming of the FRD by allowing
inventors the opportunity, through the grant of exclusionary rights and pricefixing, to recoup their costs in the form of monopoly profits.32
Exceptions exist and, under certain market conditions, inventors may
overcome the FRD without patent incentives.33 However, the patent system
operates under the presumption that without the incentives and assurances
provided by patents, inventors would be disincentivized to innovate.34 This
is the Patent Incentive Theory.35 In markets where innovation would occur
28

Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. HEALTH ECON.
107, 109–11 (1991).
29 Id. at 132 (using 1987 dollars).
30 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22
J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 166 (2003) (using 2000 dollars).
31 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 270 (comparing the free-rider dilemma to military service in a
warring society).
32 Id. (“Patents and copyrights are our society’s flagship vehicles for overcoming the free-rider
dilemma with regard to technological and artistic innovation. By granting a term of monopoly rights in
the form of a patent, the government provides a mechanism for innovators to appropriate their returns
from R&D expenditures”).
33 See id. at 276–82 (categorizing the exceptions as either “[a]narchic or [q]uasi-[l]egal [s]chemes
for [a]ppropriation” or as “[b]usiness-[b]ased or [m]anagerial [a]ppropriation [s]chemes”). Two examples
of these exceptions are: (1) non-profit organizations involved in finding cures for rare diseases where the
social value of the cure may exceed its business value, and (2) inventors with such great personal
motivation that their internal desire overcomes the invention costs—for example, the software
programmer who writes an app to then give it away as open-source code for other programmers to use
and improve upon. Id. at 276–77.
34 See Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard D. Nelson, Economic Theories About the Costs and Benefits of
Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 17,
18–21 (1997).
35 Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297, 314–15
(2015).
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despite the grant of a patent (or with lesser exclusion rights), patents generate
superfluous deadweight loss.36 In these situations, monopoly profits are
unnecessary to overcome the FRD, and they come as additional societal
deadweight loss.37 Critics of the current patent system point to this unjustified
deadweight loss when calling for patent reform.38
Another criticism of the Patent Incentive Theory is that it does not
account for deadweight loss associated with certain ancillary benefits patent
owners receive, such as “blocking patents,” “patent mining,” “defensive
patents,” or “patent signaling.”39 Blocking patents refers to groups of patents
where patentees refuse to grant licenses or accept terms that permit others to
use their invention, thus effectively restricting use in a particular line of
technology.40 Patent mining refers to the practice of patenting inventions that
create a threat comparable to “laying a minefield of patents for the unaware
patentee to tread on [that] allow[s] the portfolio holder to aggressively assert
[their] patent rights.”41 Defensive patenting refers to the practice of creating
a broad, offensive patent portfolio that creates a threat of reciprocal suit and
is used as a “deterrent . . . to prevent other competitors from suing.”42
36

Scherer, supra note 5, at 426–27.
Id.
38 See, e.g., id. at 427 (proposing a system with shorter-term patents).
39 See Kyriakos Drivas & Andreas Panagopoulos, Using the Patent Term Changes in Assessing the
Evolution of Patent Valuation From Filing to Maturity, 19 EUR. J. INNOVATION MGMT. 528, 531–32
(2016); see also Boldrin & Levine, supra note 23, at 7–9; Florian Jell & Joachim Henkel, Patent Portfolio
Races in Concentrated Markets for Technology 22 (Danish Rsch. Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Working
Paper No. 10-23, 2010); Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1522–
23 (2005).
40 Moore, supra note 39, at 1522–23 n.5. The practice of blocking patents is commonly associated
with “patent thickets,” which refers to the practice by firms to “patent[] not just . . . the products that they
actually sell, but . . . every conceivable variation of the product in order to block competition more
generally.” Id. at 1523 n.6. Blocking patent portfolios, especially in the software industry, can be asserted
to hold rival competitors hostage via the control of necessary patents. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)
25–26 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7552, 2000). Alternatively, patentees can also use
their blocking patent portfolios to reciprocally negotiate licenses with competitors in return for access to
the competitor’s technologies “enabl[ing] firms to steadily improve and expand their product lines and
processes” while blocking out other competitors without similar leverage. Id. at 26. This is known as
cross-licensing.
41 Drivas & Panagopoulos, supra note 39, at 531–32; see Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New
Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP.
45, 51–53 (2013). Patent mining is a strategy usually used by non-practicing entities; that is, entities that
seek to “monetize their patent[s,] not by marketing the patent’s innovation, but by extracting fees from
those using the patented methods when no copying occurred.” Olson, supra note 4, at 550.
42 One researcher, Professor Olson, compares the concept of defensive patents to the theory of mutual
assured destruction (“MAD”) employed by the United States and Russia during the Cold War. Olson,
supra note 4, at 526–27. Economics professors Michele Boldrin and David Levine examined a case study
involving the smartphone where Apple, the market leader, and Microsoft, a player “unable to produce a
product that appeals to consumers,” marshaled their extensive patent portfolios against the new entrant,
37
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Signaling refers to the practice of using patents as a proxy for a company’s
business acumen or as a testament to a company’s research and development
departments.43
Although these ancillary patent benefits may not directly affect the
deadweight loss associated with a patent, they indirectly affect foregone
consumer surplus by limiting alternative options available to consumers—
that is, the consumers’ ability to acquire the next most attractive good or
service.44 As Professor Fisher explains, “the foregone consumer surplus will
consist of [the deadweight loss] minus the consumer surplus reaped by those
consumers when they use their money to purchase the next most attractive
good or service.”45 The negative effect of these ancillary benefits on
consumer surplus is particularly conspicuous in blocking patents.46 A second
criticism of the Patent Incentive Theory is that it fails to account for
noneconomic incentives that inventors may have for innovation.47
2. The Behavioral Economic Theory
Researchers have found that “individuals, in general, undertake creative
activities not for a monetary reward, but because they are intrinsically
motivated to do so—because they wish to ‘engag[e] in [the] activity for its
own sake, out of interest, or for the pleasure and satisfaction derived from
the experience.’”48 This is part of the Behavioral Economic Theory. The
Patent Incentive Theory’s utilitarian-focused framework fails to account for
psychological and other behavioral traits that affect an inventor’s decision to

Google, who, while wealthy, lacked a similarly large defensive portfolio to countersue. Boldrin & Levine,
supra note 23, at 8–9. The researchers point to how these patent litigations have “generat[ed] hundreds
of millions in wasteful legal costs and no social benefit whatsoever.” Id. at 8.
43 See generally Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002). Professor
Long points to the “particularly valuable signaling role” that patents have in start-ups where venture
capitalists use patents as a proxy for good management. Id. at 653.
44 Fisher, supra note 19, at 5 n.9.
45 Id.
46 Because patentees aim their blocking patents at preventing rivals from patenting or using related
inventions, these patents create a “patent fence” around a core invention that forecloses the possibility to
rivals to develop substitutes, regardless of whether the substitutes “represent improvements upon the
original product or not [or whether] the firm [has the] intent of commercializing those inventions.” Cohen
et al., supra note 40, at 22. For example, the authors point to a case where du Pont “patented over 200
substitutes for Nylon to protect its core invention.” Id.
47 Bair, supra note 35, at 314 (commenting how “[a] number of intellectual property scholars have
pointed to a key finding from the psychology literature that calls the basic premise [that a patent is needed
to overcome the free-rider problem and encourage potential inventors to engage in innovative activities]
into question.”).
48 Id. at 314–15 (quoting Hsiu-Fen Lin, Effects of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation on Employee
Knowledge Sharing Intentions, 33 J. INFO. SCI. 135, 137 (2007)).
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innovate and which may result in the overcoming of the FRD despite an
untethering of innovation and financial retribution.49
Under the Behavioral Economic Theory, “individuals do not always
behave in strict accordance with the predictions of rational actor theory [and]
some ‘irrationalities’ . . . or pervasive deviations from welfare maximization
[are common].”50 Inventors find sufficient compensation from noneconomic
rewards, such as social recognition or personal satisfaction, which, in turn,
compensate and offset the inventor’s development costs.51 One researcher,
Professor Stephanie Bair, identified relevant intrinsic motivators: attribution,
prestige, competition, and, in the case of employees working within an
organization, personal recompense.52 One caveat to Professor Bair’s model
is that it presumes inventors are individuals whereas, in practice, most
inventors obtaining patents are inventors within institutions, who “may be
more likely to behave like rational actors, undertaking cost-benefit analyses
and subject to utilitarian incentives.”53
This caveat is relevant because, in the U.S., most patent holders are
institutional entities.54 One researcher, Professor Dan Burk, reconciled the
Behavioral Economic Theory with institutional patent holders’
pervasiveness by analyzing patenting behavior under a new institutionalism
framework.55 The new institutionalism framework “views both rationality
and efficiency as socially constructed concepts.”56 Under the new
institutionalism framework, inventors “act[] rationally, not necessarily . . .
[by] advancing their material well-being, but in the sense of defining and
expressing their identities in socially appropriate ways.”57 Hence, under a
new institutionalism analysis, rational behavior includes not only profitmaximizing behavior but also behavior that has become
“institutionalized”—that is, the behavior that has an “acceptable legitimizing
explanation” under social norms, even if it is not profit-maximizing.58 An
49

Id. at 314–17.
Dan. L Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421, 426 (2016) (citing Christine
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78 (1998)).
51 Bair, supra note 35, at 314–15.
52 See id. at 314–77.
53 Id. at 318.
54 Between 1976–78, more than 75% of all patent rights were assigned to corporate entities. John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U.L. REV.
77, 97 (2002).
55 Burk, supra note 50, at 427–30; see also Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational
Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 903, 911–13
(1996).
56 See Burk, supra note 50, at 439.
57 Id.
58 Id. (comparing institutional behavior to a “self-fulfilling prophec[y]”).
50
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institution’s research and development efforts—and by extension, its
patenting initiatives—are then self-serving measures for institutions wishing
to “align themselves with dominant social myths.”59 This is similar to
signaling, but is noneconomic in nature.60
An example of economically irrational patenting behavior that may be
better understood under the new institutionalism framework is university
patenting.61 Universities spend significant resources accumulating patents.62
However, these patents rarely generate any appreciable income to offset their
research and development costs.63 Professor Burk explains that this
seemingly irrational behavior is a result of the university’s loose coupling of
their granted patents and the value the university receives from “justify[ing]
their activities to alumni and to philanthropic donors . . . demonstrat[ing] that
the university is ‘giving back’ to the community [and] stimulating local
business and economic growth by moving the fruits of research into the
commercial sector.”64 In other words, patents provide to the university a
means for social legitimization and a way to represent itself as a
“technologically progressive and innovative [institution], worthy of the trust
that investment or employment entails.”65
Under the new institutionalism framework, incentive measures to
promote innovation should consider not only economic incentives but also
the prevalence of “inventor myths” within an industry and the effect of these
narratives on an inventor’s desire to conform.66 The primacy of these

Id. at 433–37 (arguing that “in many cases [having a research and development program] is not a
calculated decision [but] simply accepted as the way things are properly done.”).
60 Id. at 440–42 (“[A]cquisition of patents sends a type of signal to competitors, employees, and
investors . . . not a signal of economic efficiency. Rather, the signal in question here is a social or
ceremonial signal, not an economic one. The signal is one of compliance and reputability, an indication
of participation in the expected social order.”).
61 Id. at 444–46.
62 See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1374–76 (2007) (noting how The Bayh-Dole Act has “turned universities into
commercial entities . . . [and] allowed universities to irresponsibly over-patent”).
63 See, e.g., WALTER D. VALDIVIA, UNIVERSITY START-UPS: CRITICAL FOR IMPROVING
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 6-10 (2013) (concluding that “only [a] few universities raise significant revenue
from their patents and most universities lose money in their technology transfer operations”); Brian J.
Love, Do University Patents Pay Off - Evidence From a Survey of University Inventors in Computer
Science and Electrical Engineering, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 285, 329 (2014) (concluding from survey data
that “universities and faculty members alike generally lose more than they gain from filing patents on
high-tech research”).
64 Burk, supra note 50, at 445.
65 Id. at 442.
66 Id. at 440–42. Inventor myths are “th[ose] myth[s] of the solitary genius who is motivated and
rewarded for his efforts.” Id. at 441.
59
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inventor myths may be more influential in driving intellectual property
allocations than as “contemplated under the myth of incentive to innovate.”67
Failure to account for these two noneconomic, behavioral factors—
social legitimization and inventor myths—may result in additional
deadweight loss to society by granting unduly broad patents in situations
where inventors would have been incentivized to pursue their invention with
lesser rights.68
B. Mechanisms for Incentivizing Innovation
Patents and intrinsic motivation are not the only two ways inventors
overcome the FRD under the Patent Incentive Theory. A helpful way to
organize the various ways that inventors overcome the FRD is to categorize
them as Legal Mechanisms (“LMs”), Quasi-Legal Mechanisms (“QLMs”),
and Business-Based Mechanisms (“BBMs”). LMs are mechanisms that use
“coercive power to create and enforce rights and redistribute resources.”69
LMs include monopoly rights (such as patents), government rewards,
government subsidies, and trade secret protection.70 QLMs are extralegal
mechanisms that depend on goodwill and a sense of moral duty.71 QLMs
include internal motivation, community-based initiatives, and non-profit
associations.72 QLMs work best in relatively small groups with common
interests73—for example, a non-profit foundation funding research for a rare
disease where the medicine’s social value may exceed its development costs.
There is skepticism about the effectiveness of QLMs in larger groups with
diverse interests or in resource-intensive innovation efforts, such as
industries with high regulatory or research expenses.74
BBMs are mechanisms that “take advantage of market conditions and
the decision-making characteristics of customers” so that inventors may
profit from their innovation without other governmental or quasi-legal
incentives or protections.75 BBMs include first-mover advantages, sales and
service efforts, quickness, manufacturing capacity, increasing returns, and

67

Id. at 441–42.
Id. at 450 (commenting how the new institutional theory “allow[s] for a conversation about . . .
patent law even though [it] reject[s], or at least circumnavigate[s], the economic incentive paradigm for
patents”).
69 Johnson, supra note 25, at 271–72.
70 Id. at 272–76.
71 Id. at 276.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 281–82.
75 Id. at 271–72, 277–78.
68
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the establishment of proprietary architecture.76 Unlike LMs and QLMs,
BBMs are “morally neutral.”77 In other words, while LMs typically seek to
further social welfare and QLMs arise from community-based values, BBMs
do not have a similar moral grounding. BBMs are “byproducts of market
realities [that] . . . extract[] profit from innovation.”78 For this reason, BBMs
can result in outcomes that have negative social-welfare effects and for
which LMs may be a suitable response to subvert these negative outcomes.79
These incentive mechanisms do not operate exclusively from one other.
When researchers or legislators consider means for incentivizing innovation,
it is essential they consider how the incentives within the different categories
interact. For example, when granting a patent, which is an economic
incentive, the government should consider whether the inventor has any
other independent economic incentives to pursue the invention, such as
signaling to investors, or noneconomic incentives, such as personal
gratification. Granting a patent in situations where economic incentives are
unnecessary results in deadweight loss to society since the inventor would
have likely innovated without the patent or with a patent with lesser
exclusionary rights.80
II. PATENT LEVERS AFFECTING PATENT STRENGTH AND
MODELS FOR PATENT LEVER MANIPULATION
Despite the general criticisms of the patent system81 and the noted
shortcomings of using a standardized, fixed-duration patent term to
76

Id. at 278–81; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1584–89 (2003).
77 Johnson, supra note 25, at 277.
78 Id. at 277–78, n.24.
79 Id. at 277–78. The potentially socially harmful distinctions between LMs and BBMs arise in their
goals. While LMs “aspire to make society better off or to uphold some other philosophical value,” BBMs
do not have such lofty aspirations, but have the sole objective of maximizing profits for the equity holder.
Id. at 271–72. An example of a socially detrimental BBM is the establishment of a proprietary
architecture, such as a social platform, where the inventor can extract profits that overcome the FRD, but
where the inventions are focused on maximizing economic appropriations for the original inventor and
not for the benefit of society at large. On the other hand, patents are intended to stimulate innovation that
will be beneficial to society at large.
80 Professor Frank Partnoy considers this issue in finance-related business method patents, where he
argues that inventors would have developed these methods regardless of whether they received a patent.
Frank Partnoy, Finance and Patent Length 15–16 (U. San Diego, Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 19,
2001) (“Inman’s case (and others like it) raise some difficult questions about how such claims should be
treated. On one hand, patent law historically has been inapplicable to these types of patents, primarily
because of the view that society did not need to incur the costs (deadweight and distributional) associated
with the grant of patent rights in order to encourage this kind of innovation. Why should an inventor
receive seventeen, or now twenty, years of protection for innovation that likely would occur anyway?”).
81 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Separating Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a
New, Improved, Lighter, and Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
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incentivize innovation,82 the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) continues to grant patents based on a fixed twenty-year term.83
While some authors are incredulous as to whether patents can accomplish
their intended goal of incentivizing innovation,84 other authors are more
optimistic and point to how patents are but one tool in a shed.85 As a tool,
patents may be “sharpened” to better reflect their intended goal of promoting
social welfare. To sharpen them to accomplish this goal of advancing social
welfare, it is essential that legislators consider the different patent protection
dimensions.
Envision a patent as a fence and the enclosed area as the invention. The
fence’s protection is determined by the length, height, material, and duration
of time that the fence is up. The fence’s actual boundaries—the “scope” of
the invention—are defined by the patent’s claims and how courts will
interpret these claims.86 The court’s interpretation of the patent’s claims, or
“delineation,” is known as claim construction and is beyond this note’s
scope. For purposes of this note, suffice it to note that a patent’s scope is
decidedly more uncertain than its duration, which Congress has generally
fixed at twenty years.87 The dimensions that constitute a patent’s
exclusionary rights are “levers.”88 Just as a fence’s effectiveness can be
altered by strengthening its materials or increasing its height, the government
can reduce or expand a patent’s exclusionary rights by manipulating these
levers.
Two commonly discussed levers for tailoring patents are duration and
scope.89 Examples of other levers include enforcement rights, antitrust
regulations, compulsory licensing, geographic coverage, economic
conditions, and business and management conditions.90 The interplay
between these levers ultimately determines a patent’s exclusionary rights.
L. 1, 11 n.56 (2000) (citing how there “[is] no unified economic theory of patents that adequately
describes the overall patent system, demonstrates that the patent system provides a net societal benefit,
or consistently predicts the outcome of individual patent disputes”).
82 Scherer, supra note 5, at 426–27.
83 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
84 Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1336–37 (2015).
85 Johnson, supra note 25, at 271–81.
86 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 839, 839–44 (1990).
87 Johnson, supra note 25, at 286 (“The breadth or scope of a patent is doctrinally much more
complicated than duration. A change in scope can [modify] the kinds of inventions that can be patented”).
88 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 76, at 1579–80 (describing patent levers as flexible legal standards
that allow courts the responsibility to adapt patent statutes to evolving technologies and “implicitly or
explicitly permit the courts to take account of different types of innovation in different industries”).
89 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 285.
90 See id. at 285–89.
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One researcher, Professor Mario Biagioli, notes how there is substantial
tension between a patent as a fixed legal object when it is first granted, a
“baby patent,” and the different embodiments the patent will assume over its
twenty-year life as it navigates through the legal system.91 For incentivizing
innovation, LMs generally have an advantage over QLMs and BBMs in that
they are under direct government control and are coercively enforced by the
government.92 In the case of patents, this control confers the government the
power to tailor a patent’s exclusionary rights via manipulation of policy
levers.93 Patent duration is an ideal lever for manipulation because it is a fixed
lever and the government can distinctly manipulate it across different
industry types.94 By adjusting patent duration, the government can tailor
patents to produce welfare-maximizing outcomes—that is, optimal patent
lengths.95 Patents with optimal lengths (or optimal duration) will bestow
inventors with sufficient monopoly profits to entice them to innovate without
incurring surplus societal deadweight loss.96
A.

Patent Duration as a Lever for Tailoring Patent Rights

Congress has a history of manipulating patent duration to further
innovation policy.97 For example, in the nineteenth century, either Congress
or the Commissioner of Patents would periodically extend individual patent
terms from fourteen to twenty-one years upon showing by a patentee that
they had not “obtained sufficient remuneration during the original patent
term.”98 In response to requests for a longer, twenty-year patent term,
Congress modified the patent term from fourteen to seventeen years from the

91

Biagioli, supra note 17, at 154 (specifically referring to the different embodiments patents may
assume as “enabled by the doctrine of equivalents”).
92 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 272–81. QLMs, on the other hand, depend on a community’s
goodwill and sense of moral duty, so they are not subject to government controls. Id. at 271. Likewise,
BBMs depend on market conditions and customer preferences, so they are not subject to government
controls. Id.
93 See id. at 272.
94 See id. at 288-89.
95 See Scherer, supra note 5, at 424.
96 This optimal duration is an equilibrium based on the inventor’s development costs and their ability
to appropriate returns during a patent term to offset these costs. See id. at 424 (explaining how the more
extended a patent term is, the better a profit-maximizing firm can appropriate returns, but at a price to
society welfare).
97 Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 374
n.19 (1994).
98 Id. (citing David S. Forman & Thomas W. Winland, How Will Existing License Agreements be
Affected by Extended Patent Terms Under GATT, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 449 (1994)).
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issue date99—issue date referring to the date when the USPTO issued the
patent after determining the applicant was “entitled to a patent under the law”
and the applicant had paid the issue and publication fees.100 In 1994, with the
enactment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),
Congress modified the patent term to twenty years from the filing date101—
filing date referring to “the date on which a specification, with or without
claims, was received in the United States Patent and Trademark Office.”102
Aside from these comprehensive congressional patent duration reforms,
administrative agencies have also modified patent duration via focalized
exceptions.103 One such exception is found in the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”), which
seeks “to extend the life of drug patents and patents of other regulated
products.”104 The Hatch-Waxman Act improves one known shortcoming of
patents in the pharmaceutical industry—given the extraordinary
development costs and exceptional risks of failure in the industry, patent
durations may be too short to incentivize innovation.105 The Hatch-Waxman
Act provides for an extension of patent terms under certain conditions.106

99

See Victor Abramson, The Economic Bases of Patent Reform, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 339, 348
(1948) (criticizing the fixed-term patent grants); Lemley, supra note 97, at 372 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 155,
156 (1988)).
100 35 U.S.C. §§ 151–54.
101 35 U.S.C. § 154. Congress implemented this adjustment in 1994 as part of the U.S.’s obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement by enacting the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). Although Congress did not implement this
adjustment to incentivize innovation, at least one researcher studied the effects of the change of patent
duration on innovation. See David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent
Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1641–42 (2009) (finding that the change
in patent duration “had a heterogeneous impact across patent classes”).
102 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(4).
103 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155–56 (empowering the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to extend
process and composition of matter patents to compensate for delays in regulatory approval).
104 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2750 (9th ed. 2020) (stating how one part of the Hatch-Waxman Act “was designed to
create new incentives for research and development of certain products subject to premarket government
approval by a regulatory agency”); Joanna Thompson, The Case for Extending Patent Terms for Drugs
That Treat Rare Diseases 14–19 (June 2013) (M.A. thesis, University of Denver) (ProQuest ); see also
Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984 Drug Act, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 195, 197 (1986) (estimating that the Hatch–Waxman Act added about three years to the
effective life of pharmaceutical patents).
105 While Title I of the Hatch-Waxman Act focused on generic drugs, Title II sought to extend the
life of drug patents to “help[] . . . compensate for regulatory delay and ensure that innovators had ‘a
reasonable opportunity to recoup development costs and to make a profit irrespective of the existence of
patents.’” Thompson, supra note 104, at 16 (citing Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for
Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness - A Political Legislative and Legal History of
U.S. Law and Observations for the Future, 39 IDEA 389, 406 (1999)).
106 Id.
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However, because this adjustment is a fixed-term ad hoc correction,
uncorrelated to economic or behavioral variables that affect an inventor’s
incentives to innovate, the Hatch-Waxman Act has not resolved the issue of
granting patent terms that are social welfare-maximizing.107 Effective
modifications to patent duration should consider industry-specific
preferences and account for differences in responses to economic and
noneconomic incentives.
B. Lever Manipulations Should Account for Industry Differences
Patents do not incentivize innovation equally across industries.108
Researchers have found abundant empirical evidence to support this.109
Drivas and Panagopoulos found that the pharmaceutical and chemical
industry valued patents more than any other sector.110 Corroborating their
finding, Professor Edwin Mansfield discovered that, while patents were
unnecessary in several industries to incentivize innovation, the
pharmaceutical industry would not have introduced into the market most—
(65%)—of its inventions without a patent incentive.111 One researcher, Judd
N.L. Cramer, argued that, while patents appeared to be significant in the
Drugs & Medical, Computers & Communication, and Chemicals and
Electrical categories, patents were “particularly important for inventions in
the Drugs & Medical category.”112 In fact, patents are so critical in the
pharmaceutical industry that, in instances where pharmaceutical companies
cannot secure patent protection due to novelty or nonobviousness issues,
companies likely forego the development of a new drug and deprive society
of potentially valuable innovations.113
107

See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (describing the conditions for granting extensions).
Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN.
REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 397, 410–11 (2012) (noting that “the costs of innovation in different technologies
vary significantly and that the industrial sectors that rely on these technologies experience the patent
system differently . . . [and] where development costs are astronomical and where the risks of lost
investment are high, . . . a greater reward to prompt investment [is required]”).
109 See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 54, at 139–44; Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High
Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1274–1320 (2009).
110 Drivas & Panagopoulos, supra note 39, at 529–30 (“This result . . . finds patents as being more
valuable (as incentives to innovate) to the pharmaceutical and chemical industry. . . .”); Judd N. L.
Cramer, Essays in Labor Economics and Innovation 31 (Jan. 2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University).
111 Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175 (1986);
see also Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development,
3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 797, 816 (1987).
112 Cramer, supra note 110, at 32–33.
113 Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503,
515–16 (2009) (arguing for the implementation of an FDA-reviewed exclusivity period for drugs that
108
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However, the pharmaceutical industry is atypical. Compared to other
sectors, this industry has exceptionally high development costs combined
with an extremely low likelihood of success.114 To illustrate, the probability
of a compound in preclinical development resulting in a marketable product
is less than 1 in 4,000.115 Of the products that make it to the market, only
three in ten will produce enough revenue to recoup research and
development (“R&D”) costs.116 Pharmaceutical companies rely on the “one
blockbuster drug” to offset the R&D and marketing costs for all of their
unviable research attempts and commercially unfruitful products.117 Without
exclusionary patent rights for this one blockbuster drug, competitors could
freeride off the inventor’s costly R&D and sell the product at the MCP.
Given the exceptionally high stakes, it is unsurprising that the
pharmaceutical industry also has higher patent litigation rates than other
industries.118
In stark contrast, the Tech119 industry is so disaffected by patents and
patent incentives that, at one point, they openly lobbied Congress for
shortened patent terms120 and reported that they would have developed most
of their inventions without having patent incentives.121 To remedy what they
viewed as a “deeply dysfunctional” patent system, the Tech industry pushed
for a patent reform bill—the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011

complete the FDA’s clinical-trial process to promote the development of unpatentable drugs); see also
Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 153, 164 (2016) (suggesting pharmaceutical companies show bias to developing drugs with
“comparatively short[er] development times” because of the fixed patent duration).
114 Roin, supra note 113, at 507–15.
115 Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and
Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 417 (2008).
116 Thompson, supra note 104, at 28.
117 Id.
118 Moore, supra note 39, at 1547–48; Allison & Lemley, supra note 54, at 140 (“In particular, patent
litigation is especially likely to occur in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, the two
industries whose patentees spent the most time in prosecution and that were the second and third highest
citers of prior art”).
119 As used colloquially and in this note, “Tech” refers to “business[es] that provide a digital technical
service/product/platform/hardware, or heavily rel[y] on it, as its primary revenue source,” and includes
software, semiconductors, and hardware companies. Catherine Heath, What is a ‘Tech Company,’
Anyway?, TECH NATION (Nov. 1, 2017), https://technation.io/news/tech-company-definition/
[https://perma.cc/H26U-XQ5E].
120 See Matt Richtel, Chairman of Amazon Urges Reduction of Patent Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/11/business/chairman-of-amazon-urges-reduction-of-patentterms.html [https://perma.cc/5AQT-93MJ] (reporting how the chairman of Amazon was “calling for the
government to limit patents for software and Internet business models to three to five years and to require
a period for public comment on patent applications in those areas before they [we]re granted”).
121 Roin, supra note 3, at 678–81.
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(“AIA”).122 Given their divergent views on patents, the AIA pitted the
pharmaceutical and Tech industries (and their lobbying muscles) against one
another. The result was a stalemate. The bill eventually passed, but without
any of its original ideals.123 Research and development costs partly explain
the stark difference between the pharmaceutical and Tech industries.124
Industries with high development and regulatory costs will favor patents and
exclusionary rights, whereas industries with low development and regulatory
costs will be less favorable to patents.125 This observation could explain why,
within the Tech industry, subindustries with higher development costs (e.g.,
hardware and semiconductors) display mixed-effects regarding patents while
subindustries with lower development costs (e.g., software) display negative
patent effects.126 Another author, Professor Carl Shapiro, noted how, in fastmoving industries, the rules governing patent litigation and settlements
might be “arguably far more important to patentees” than patent duration.127
Thus, lever manipulations seeking to modify patent rights based on patent
duration should account for these differences in development costs amongst
industries.
Development costs, however, are not the only factor that should be
accounted for when adjusting patent duration to tailor patent rights. As
suggested under the new institutionalism framework, noneconomic factors
also have a role.128 Two such factors are the pervasiveness of inventor myths
within an industry and the role of social legitimization as a signal.129 This is
likely the case in institutionalized behavior, such as in universities, where a
patent’s prestige may carry more value than its potential economic returns.130

122

Id. at 679.
See id. at 704–12.
124 See id. at 680.
125 Id.
126 See id. at 717-81; One other distinction with Tech patents is that inventors often direct them at
unpatentable “abstract ideas.” See Tanner Mort, Abstract Ideas: The Time Has Come for Congress to
Address the Patentability of Software and Business Method Inventions, 56 IDAHO L. REV. 383, 386 (2020)
(citing Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 219–20 (2014)) (explaining how “inventors claiming
entitlement to a patent for a software or business method innovation may commonly be denied such a
grant, as the only thing the inventor may have accomplished is to implement a well-known practice that
is ‘long prevalent in our system of commerce’ on a Computer”).
127 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 392 (2003).
128 See Burk, supra note 50, at 440–42.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 440–45. The other often mentioned setting where inventors highly prize patents for their
signaling value is in startups. See Graham et al., supra note 109, at 1306–08 (detailing four theories of
why patents are essential in attracting venture capital to startup firms); see also Long, supra note 43, at
642 (explaining how rational actors may still seek patent protection “when a patent’s expected signaling
value is high, even if the expected but-for rents are negligible or the expected costs large”). Given this
123
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Given these differing values and views on patents amongst industries, it is
unsurprising that individual inventors within different industries will
respond differently to lever manipulations.
C. Models for Manipulating Patent Duration to Affect Patent Strength
There are various ways in which governments may manipulate patent
duration to incentivize innovation and adjust for industry-specific economic
and noneconomic behavioral factors.131 One scholar, Professor Eric Johnson,
separated these manipulation mechanisms as either ad hoc—that is,
adjustments relative to a fixed value—or comprehensive—that is, systems
that prescribe a patent duration value.132 Examples of ad hoc fixes include
modifying duration based on market reach (e.g., inventions with a global
market would have shorter durations) or tailoring patent terms to
macroeconomic conditions (e.g., extending patent durations during
economic downturns).133
On the other hand, comprehensive systems focus on prescribing
absolute patent duration values rather than adjustments to pre-fixed values.134
These values are determined by economic models based on empiricallybacked data from various categories and help calculate a patent’s “optimal
patent life.”135 Professor Johnson provided five examples of comprehensive
models: 1) legislative processes where Congress balances industry interests
to find a patent duration that satisfactorily balances all interests among
inventors; 2) durations set by administrative agencies that balance industry
and societal interests; 3) an ad hoc framework system to allow negotiation
of patent durations between affected actors; 4) a system of standardized,
fixed, and industry-specific patent durations where inventors have the option
to apply for extended patent durations in an adversarial hearing with
government counsel; and 5) a system of automatic or semi-automatic
algorithms that combine an inventor’s financial information with other

trend, I expect that in industries with a high concentration of startups or in relatively new industries, the
value attributed to patents for their signaling capability would be higher than in older industries.
131 See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 106, 108–11 (1990) (analyzing the relationship dynamics between patent duration and patent
“breadth”); see also, e.g., Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21
RAND J. ECON. 113, 113 (1990) (“For example, if a company invents a new drug to alleviate a heart
condition, how similar a drug should a competitor be allowed to sell?”); Louis Kaplow, The PatentAntitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1823–29 (1984) (exploring limitations to
patent grants under Antitrust Doctrine and the Sherman Act).
132 Johnson, supra note 25, at 292–93.
133 Id. at 293–96.
134 Id. at 295-96.
135 Id. at 297. Referring to a patent duration that is social-welfare-maximizing.
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economic data.136 To illustrate, I describe below two patent duration
manipulation mechanisms.
1. Shorter Fixed Terms with an Option to Extend Based on Merit
Professor Scherer proposed a system of shorter patent durations where
the government could grant inventors term extensions if the inventors proved
their invention deserved greater protection.137 To qualify for such extensions,
inventors would have the burden of showing their inventions met certain
conditions.138 Examples of these conditions would include instances where
the “market [wa]s small relative to the costs of research, or [where] the cost
savings achieved were modest in relation to research costs.”139 This system’s
premise is that, given the uncertainty of determining a patent’s ultimate value
to society ex ante, the government can reduce incurring unnecessary
deadweight loss by initially granting shorter duration patents.140 This system
is similar to Professor Johnson’s fourth example of “Presumptions and
Burden-Setting in an Adversarial Proceeding.”141
One benefit from this system is that, by reducing the term of patent
grants, the inventions that “would be lost would be primarily those
inventions with relatively low benefit-cost ratios—those which in any event
are not likely to have a great impact on social welfare.”142 Some limitations
of Professor Scherer’s model are that it results in increased transactional
costs from renovation petitions and hearings, it potentially implicates
indefinite duration terms that complicate calculating a patent’s value,143 and

136

Id. at 302–08.
Scherer, supra note 5, at 427 (describing how a “best of both worlds” policy could “be achieved
through a flexible system of compulsory licensing, under which the patent recipient bears the burden of
showing why his patent should not expire or be licensed at modest royalties to all applicants three or five
years after its issue”).
138 More precisely, patentees would be able to overcome the burden by “demonstrat[ing] that [their]
invention fell into one or more of the categories in which longer protection is needed to satisfy the
Lebensraum condition.” Id.
139 On the other hand, “[w]hen a [patentee] possesse[d] a substantial share of the relevant market and
[had] well-established marketing channels, . . . there would be a presumption [against the patentee] that
positive innovation profits could normally be attained without the added inducement of strong patent
protection.” Id.
140 Id. at 426–27 (pointing to how in certain circumstances, such as “[w]hen market concentration is
high and nonpatent barriers to new entry are present, . . . [a] uniform policy of long-lived patent grants
[will] confer[] excessive private rewards.”).
141 Johnson, supra note 25, at 305–06.
142 Scherer, supra note 5, at 426.
143 Indefinite patent terms are problematic because, in cases where competing firms rely on these
expiry terms to introduce competing products, indefinite terms may result in delays. See Johnson, supra
note 25, at 287 (explaining how compulsory licensing would reduce patentee rewards by allowing
competitors to gain manufacturing and marketing experience during the patent term and not after the
patent term’s expiry, hence reducing monopoly effects).
137
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it potentially disincentivizes inventors from innovating because of the
uncertainty in recouping their development costs in a shorter time frame.144
One other limitation of Professor Scherer’s model is that, because he bases
his model on two utilitarian-focused variables, percentage of cost reduction
and dollars of research costs,145 it fails to account for behavioral factors.
2. Duration Based on Time-to-Market
Another researcher, Professor Benjamin N. Roin, proposed a system
where patent duration is determined based on an invention’s “time-tomarket.”146 Professor Roin defines time-to-market as “the time it takes to
move from the initial idea to its first sale as a commercialized product.”147
Time-to-market, in turn, is a “reliable indicia” of an invention’s R&D costs,
risks of failure, anticipated future revenue streams, and potential for
imitation by rivals.148 Time-to-market acts as a proxy for calculating the
amount of patent protection needed to incentivize innovation.149 This model
is akin to Professor Johnson’s second example, “Presumptions and BurdenSetting in an Adversarial Proceeding,” where administrative agencies
balance industry and societal interests to prescribe specific patent
durations.150
Professor Roin’s model’s strength is that it proposes a unit of
measurement that may be more indicative of an inventor’s economic
incentives than development costs alone.151 Because time-to-market involves

144

Id. at 298. Professor Scherer contemplated one such scenario—inventions involving
extraordinary risk and uncertainty that require the inventor to take “unusually bold, farsighted, timeconsuming departures from orthodox technology” and where an “exceptional reward . . . may be
necessary to induce investment.” Scherer, supra note 5, at 427. In such scenarios, Professor Scherer
volunteers his system “be waived upon a showing that the patent recipient exhibited exceptional creativity
or undertook unusual technical and/or commercial risks in the invention’s development.” Id. Although
when Professor Scherer published his note in 1972, he believed such cases to be “rare” (i.e., embracing
not more than a dozen or so major inventions per year), these exceptions would likely be more common
in the present and implicate many of the new drugs in the pharmaceutical industry. Id.
145 See Scherer, supra note 5, at 422.
146 Roin, supra note 3, at 727–34.
147 Id. at 684. He posits using time-to-market as a proxy for optimal patent strength. Id. In turn, patent
duration (length) can be used as a policy lever to tailor patent awards to match time-to-market. Id. at 754
(“Perhaps the easiest way to tailor patent awards based on time-to-market would be through a variable
patent term, since patent length is the least complicated policy lever in patent law”).
148 Id. at 684.
149 Id.
150 Johnson, supra note 25, at 305-06.
151 Unlike Professor Scherer’s earlier model, which factored in only development costs, Scherer,
supra note 5, at 422, the time-to-market model factors in four variables that affect optimal patent
strength—”(1) R&D costs, (2) the risk of failure, (3) the anticipated revenue streams from the invention,
and (4) the existence of other barriers to competitive imitation (particularly imitation costs).” Roin, supra
note 3, at 698–99.
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development costs and risks for failure, this model would be better able to
internalize the pharmaceutical industry’s extreme circumstances of high
development costs and low likelihood of success.152 Accounting for risk of
failure is particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry because R&D
investments “tend to focus on new therapeutic targets, which are
characterized by high uncertainty and difficulty, but [will have] lower
expected post-launch competition.”153 The model also potentially internalizes
other industry-specific differences, such as subsequent innovation, and
accounts for industry-specific differences regarding product life cycles.154 As
in Professor Scherer’s model, Professor Roin’s model does not account for
industry-specific noneconomic, behavioral factors.
These two systems represent improvements over the current system in
that they address a commonly criticized shortcoming of the present patent
system—granting patents of standardized length to all inventions and
potentially incurring an overpayment for inventions. However, because both
systems are utilitarian-focused, they also share the limitation that they do not
account for behavioral factors that affect innovation incentives, such as
inventor myths or social legitimization. One model that researchers have not
contemplated in-depth in the literature but that could potentially be helpful
for factoring into many of the essential variables associated with patent
duration is an automatic or semi-automatic algorithmic model.155
III. LEVER MANIPULATIONS: ONE ALGORITHM TO RULE THEM
ALL
Algorithms are a relatively new concept in the law, but they have gained
popularity as researchers use them to examine legal doctrines or quantify
legal notions.156 At least one research group has used an algorithm to predict
patentability by calculating quantitative values for nonobviousness.157
Similarly, researchers can theoretically apply algorithms to prescribe optimal
patent duration based on a predefined set of empirical values.158 The

152 The time-to-market model calculates the pharmaceutical industry to have an average time-tomarket of 12 to 16 years, the second-highest after “[f]uel cells.” Roin, supra note 3, at 717–22, 728.
153 Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG
DISCOVERY 428, 436 (2011).
154 Roin, supra note 3, at 685, 735–38.
155 See Johnson, supra note 25, at 306–08.
156 See Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña & Ryan Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 63, 104–36 (2020) (developing an empirical, algorithmic measure of patentability based on the
authors’ network theory of innovation).
157 Id.
158 Johnson, supra note 25, at 306–08; see also Pedraza-Fariña & Whalen, supra note 156, at 63–75
(detailing how the authors used patent classification records to calculate “network nonobviousness score”
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government can use this calculated value as actual patent duration159 or as a
presumptive duration that the inventor can either agree to or use as a basis
for negotiations with an administrative agency to determine the actual
duration in an adversarial proceeding.160
A. Defining and Establishing Boundaries for Industry-Specific
Classifications Using an Algorithm
Any model proposing to tailor patents across industries differentially
will inevitably run into classification issues related to “properly sorting
inventions into discrete categories [because t]he dividing lines . . . are porous
and change over time, and many inventions fall within multiple distinct
technological categories.”161 As a corollary to this issue, any model that
separates patents into categories with differential patent durations will
“inevitably [run into] line-drawing disputes.”162 As Professor Roin points
out, “[u]nless the government can resolve the inevitable line-drawing
questions based on the relevant economic characteristics of the inventions at
issue (as opposed to their technological characteristics), firms will be able to
draft their patents so that they fall within the categories offering more

(NNOS) indices based on technology combination frequencies to “design a prescriptive, doctrinal legal
test”).
159 Professor Johnson suggests a system where Congress uses the current 20-year term as a starting
point and then “slowly adjust[s] the duration up or down until the desired level is reached.” Johnson,
supra note 25, at 307–08. Changes to the patent term “would be slow, so as not to shock any industrial
sector [and, p]erhaps durations could change by no more than one year on an annual basis.” Id. at 307–
08.
160 Implementing the concepts from Professor Scherer’s model, Scherer, supra note 5, at 427, I
propose that, instead of using the algorithmic computation as an end value for a patent’s duration,
Congress or the USPTO can use this algorithmic computation as an initial value for negotiations. Because
this value is based on empirically-backed data and not on a fixed 3- or 5- year term, as Professor Scherer
suggested, id., many of the limitations identified with the system would be mitigated, such as increased
transactional costs, potential disincentivizing, and indefinite duration. Presumably, patentees would be
more amenable to these calculated values and less inclined to appeal. At the same time, inventors with
socially valuable inventions would have the option to appeal for longer terms, as necessary. Further, the
patent term would be defined ex ante in a single hearing to prevent indefinite or uncertain patent durations.
161 Roin, supra note 3, at 710 (citations omitted). To illustrate the issue, Professor Roin points to an
invention for “brain-computer interface technology, which may be akin to software, computer hardware,
other electronics, medical devices, diagnostics, video game technology, or any other field that is likely to
use these inventions.” Id.
162
Id. at 755. As Professor Roin points, when sorting into categories where patent duration will be
affected, “[p]atent applicants [can] take advantage of the ambiguous boundaries between technologies by
drafting their patent claims to select into favored categories.” Id. at 710. “For example, when courts
initially prohibited pure software patents, patentees responded by drafting software claims as ‘computer
systems’ that implemented software to get around the restriction. Likewise, when the PTO created a
‘second look’ program for business method patents to provide for a more rigorous examination process,
patent applicants simply reframed their business-method claims so they could file their application in a
different PTO division.” Id. (citations omitted).
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protection.”163 To overcome these classification issues under the time-tomarket model,164 Professor Roin suggests the government devise
“technology-specific categories to minimize the number of line-drawing
disputes—either by sorting inventions into fewer categories or using
technology-specific laws with clearer boundaries.”165 In cases where disputes
remain over an invention’s class, the government can then analyze on a caseby-case basis.166
Building upon this principle from the time-to-market model, an
algorithm based on empirical data of an invention’s relevant economic
characteristics167 could potentially define such technology-specific
categories and adjust patent duration based on an inventor’s specific
cluster.168 Presumably, because such an algorithm would have data from
various economic factors and not just time-to-market, it would be able to
discern these technology-specific clusters more acutely.169
For example, inventions made by Tesla, a company that produces and
sells electric vehicles, under a traditional model would be classified in the
“Automobile” industry based on its type of business.170 However, the
company’s research and development (“R&D”) activities and business
model have more in common with the Tech industry than with the
Automobile industry.171 Under the algorithmic model, the algorithm would
163

Id. at 707.
The time-to-market model assumes that this factor, an invention’s time-to-market, internalizes
these technology-specific variabilities so that the government can use this metric to “judge which
industries or classes of technology need more protection than others.” Id. at 711.
165 Id. at 755.
166 See id. At 725. These case-by-case analyses, however, add transactional costs. See id.
167 Id. at 755.
168 The time-to-market model proposes categorizing inventions based on R&D times and industries
with lengthy R&D times having a “highly gradated system of tailored patent awards” and industries with
short R&D times having “minimal tailoring.” Id. at 756.
169 One researcher, Professor Kimberly Moore (now, Chief Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit), collected empirical data from all utility patents issued by the USPTO in
1991 (96,713) and, when classifying by technology, pointed to the shortcomings of the USPTO’s
technology classification system. Moore, supra note 39, at 1529 n.35. “In addition to the problems
inherent in broad technology classifications (for example, pharmaceutical and medical device patents are
grouped together and may be very different in nature) . . . another shortcoming of this classification
system is [that it is] based on the PTO technology classification system, [which] commentators have
observed do[es] not group all similar technology together and as a result, may not be ideal for
distinguishing among technologies.” Id.
170 There is no such “Automobile” classification category, and this comparison is for representational
purposes only. The USPTO classification system is based on the Cooperative Patent Classification
Scheme. European Patent Office & United States Patent Office, COOPERATIVE PATENT CLASSIFICATION,
http://www.cooperativepatentclassification.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/R32F-XMYZ]. Under this
system, the USPTO would classify a general vehicle invention under class “B60.” Id.
171 Bruno Aziza, Why Tesla is Not a Car Company and What You Can Learn From Elon Musk,
FORBES (May 20, 2019, 1:18 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2019/05/20/why-tesla-is164
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analyze different sets of empirical data, including R&D expenses,172 and
classify Tesla based on these data variables instead of solely on the industry
of the type of good sold.173 Potentially, the algorithm could classify the
company in a technology-specific (sui generis) category along with other
similar companies in manufacturing industries that have significant R&D
expenses and reliance on technology.174
Once the algorithm has determined proper classes for categorizing
inventors, the next step would be to identify input variables for the algorithm
for calculating patent duration. At least one variable should be financial and
account for development costs and ancillary benefits.175 Another variable
should be noneconomic and at least account for the prevalence of inventor
myths and social legitimization.176
B. Economic Variables in an Algorithmic Model
Patents are premised on the principle that they allow inventors to
overcome the FRD and incentivize innovation by generating a producer
surplus equal to or greater than the invention’s development costs.177 Under
the algorithmic model, the algorithm would adjust this producer surplus, as
determined by patent duration, to create welfare-maximizing conditions
not-a-car-company-and-what-you-can-learn-from-elon-musk/?sh=fe640dc2d795
[https://perma.cc/XHE5-X27Y]; Tyler Clifford, Jim Cramer Calls Tesla a ‘Tech Company,’ Says 2020
Is Its ‘Breakout Year’, CNBC (Jan. 22, 2020, 6:58 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/jim-cramercalls-2020-a-breakout-year-for-tech-companytesla.html#:~:text=Tesla%20is%20a%20technology%20enterprise,a%20tech%20company%20on%20w
heels [https://perma.cc/THF2-BPLB].
172 Roin, supra note 3, at 684.
173 Johnson, supra note 25, at 306–08. Other data that could potentially be fed into the algorithm is
“innovation activity, patent effectiveness, incentives, and loss to social welfare.” Id..
174 The exact composition of these categories would be subject to the economic data fed into the
algorithm, with more data likely resulting in more graded classes. For example, one other company that
could be in a similar category as Tesla is JUUL Labs, Inc. (“JUUL”). JUUL is a “Tobacco” company that
manufactures nicotine vapes, but its research and development model more closely resemble a Tech
company. See Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, JUUL LABS, INC., https://www.juul.com/intellectualproperty-list [https://perma.cc/Q2PP-MCEJ]; Kim Lyons, New Juul Patent Application Hints at AIPowered Vape to Help Users Quit Nicotine, THE VERGE (Feb. 25, 2020, 1:28 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/25/21152436/juul-patent-e-cigarettes-vaping-ai-smartphone-quitnicotine [https://perma.cc/BZ8E-LQ3A]; Scott Graham, Juul Seeking Broad Order to Exclude Look-Alike
E-Cigarettes,
THE
RECORDER
(Jul.
13,
2020,
9:02
PM),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/07/13/juul-seeking-broad-order-to-exclude-look-alike-ecigarettes/ [https://perma.cc/U4WH-87BT].
175 See supra Section II.A.1.
176 See supra Section II.A.2.
177 Johnson, supra note 25, at 270 (“Patents and copyrights are our society’s flagship vehicles for
overcoming the free-rider dilemma [and, b]y granting a term of monopoly rights in the form of a patent,
the government provides a mechanism for innovators to appropriate their returns from R&D
expenditures”); see also Fisher, supra note 19, at 4–6.
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(optimal patent length).178 To determine optimal patent length, the algorithm
would need to account for variables that affect an inventor’s development
costs or barriers to appropriating returns, such as R&D expenses, risks of
failure, anticipated revenue streams (if successful), and the potential for
imitation.179 Alternatively, the algorithm could simply account for an
invention’s time-to-market, which internalizes these four factors in a single
metric.180
In addition to the actual producer surplus that patentees receive from
their patents, patentees also receive intangible benefits unaccounted for in
the Patent Incentive Theory.181 Some of these intangible benefits include
blocking technologies with patents, patent mining, and defensive patents.182
The algorithm would need to account for these variables. For example, in
industries with a high percentage of patent mining or blocking patents, the
algorithm could curtail patent duration for inventors that were already
receiving benefits from these practices.
C.

Behavioral Variables and Other Intangibles in an Algorithmic Model

Behavioral factors play a role in incentivizing inventors to innovate.
These behavioral factors vary based on the inventor’s entity—whether a
corporate entity or a human inventor183—and on the type of industry—
industries with prevalent inventor myths will have stronger responses to
nonbehavioral factors.184 Given these factors’ inherently qualitative values,
empirical data regarding behavior is less available than quantitative
economic data. The development of databases regarding behavioral
innovation patterns would help generate empirical data to feed into the
algorithm. Researchers can generate data via survey questions designed by

178 Fisher, supra note 19, at 10 (“Ideally, patent duration or strength should be increased up to the
point where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs”).
179 Roin, supra note 3, at 684 (The “optimal patent award for inventions is primarily a function of
their R&D costs, the risk of failure in R&D, the anticipated future revenue streams from the projects if
they succeed, and the potential for imitation by rivals”).
180 Id. at 672 (positing “there is a strong, positive correlation between the amount of time needed to
complete an R&D project and the amount of patent protection (if any) necessary to motivate investment
in that R&D project [because a] longer time-to-market is associated with higher out-of-pocket R&D costs,
greater risk of failure, increased opportunity costs of R&D investments, and diminished value of future
revenue streams from the developed invention because of discounting”).
181 See supra Section II.A.1.
182 Id.
183 Bair, supra note 35, at 318.
184 See supra Section II.A.2.

216

19:191 (2022)

Maximizing Social Welfare Through Patent Duration Tailoring

qualified psychologists. These surveys should at least address two themes
linked to innovation incentives—personal motivation and inventor myths.185
CONCLUSION
Although patents likely do incentivize certain kinds of innovation and
inventors would not have discovered some present inventions absent the
prospect of a patent grant, many other such inventions and innovations would
have been discovered independent of the prospect of a patent. Because
society bears a cost for each patent that the USPTO grants to inventors, all
such inventions that would have been discovered without a patent or with
lesser patent rights result in a net loss to society. Since a patent’s ultimate
purpose is to generate social welfare, Congress should adjust the existing
patent system so that patents produce social welfare-maximizing outcomes.
One way to accomplish this is by adjusting the patent term to match the
amount necessary to incentivize an inventor to innovate but that will not
result in unnecessary societal deadweight loss. This equilibrium point is a
patent’s optimal term.
To determine a patent’s optimal term, Congress must account for
economic and behavioral factors. Under the time-to-market model—
generally under the Patent Incentive Theory—four essential factors for
determining optimal duration are an invention’s R&D costs, risks of failure,
anticipated future revenue streams, and potential for imitation by rivals.
Similarly, under the new institutionalism framework—generally under the
Behavioral Economic Theory—two essential factors for determining optimal
duration are the prevalence of inventor myths in an industry and the social
legitimization value of patents in their respective industries.
Two noteworthy models that researchers have proposed for adjusting
patent duration as a means for social welfare maximization are: (1) a model
with shorter, fixed-term patents with an option for patentees to extend their
patents upon a showing of cause; and (2) a model with a patent duration
adjusted to the invention’s time-to-market. A third and comparatively novel
system for adjusting patent duration is a system that uses algorithms to
calculate patent duration based on empirical data. I propose one such system
where the USPTO uses an algorithm to calculate a presumptive patent
duration based on economic and behavioral data, and a patentee has the
option to either accept the terms or appeal in an adversarial proceeding for a
185 Id. These two variables presumptively affect incentives to innovate amongst inventors. By
measuring these two variables across industries, researchers may assess and quantify differences across
industries to properly adjust patent durations. Alternatively, these responses may be inputtedu into the
algorithm so that the algorithm uses these responses to assist in sorting inventions into technologyspecific categories within industries. Id.
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longer term upon a showing of cause. One advantage of this algorithmic
model is that the algorithm can be designed to self-determine categorical
boundaries for inventions based on the inventor’s economic and
noneconomic data and avoid invention misclassifications. Based on an
invention’s class and other empirical data, including an invention’s time-tomarket and other industry-specific behavioral factors, the algorithm can
calculate a patent duration that produces social welfare-maximizing
outcomes.
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